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SYNECDOCHE
Gerald Torres*
Synecdoche, n. A figure of speech in which a part is substi-
tuted for a whole or a whole for a part, as in 50 head of cattle for
50 cows, or the army for a soldier.'
Metonymy, n. A figure of speech that consists of the use of
the name of one object or concept for that of another to which it is
related, or of which it is a part, as scepter for sovereignty or the
bottle for strong drink or count heads (or noses) for count people.2
INTRODUCTION
These two terms, synecdoche and metonymy, came to mind when I
agreed to participate in the discussion panel assembled by Professor Valdes,
called Latinalo Education and Justice: Leading Voices, Lessons Learned.3
While this panel endeavored to answer many questions of great importance
to the Latino community,4 this article focuses on the related question of
whether there are necessarily unstated assumptions regarding the relation-
ship between facts we observe and a theory of change these facts may sug-
gest. This question raises a puzzling kind of synecdoche. Namely, to what
extent could the present part (an elite status Latina/o) represent and/or influ-
ence a future for the whole (greater success for Latinalos who aspired to
social mobility and public service)?
* Bryant Smith Chair, University of Texas at Austin. I would like to thank Professors
Tamara Piety and Lani Guinier for their helpful comments throughout.
' See Synecdoche, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/synecdoche
(last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
2 See Metonymy, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/metonymy (last
visited Feb. 13, 2011).
The panel was composed of the following panelists, each of whom shared an identity as
Latina/os who recently headed or currently head a national legal organization: Raquel Adana
and Steve Bender, Co-Presidents of SALT (The Society of American Law Teachers); Laura
Gomez, President, Law and Society Association; Kris Gutierrez, President, American Educa-
tional Research Association; Beto Juarez and Margaret Montoya, Past Co-Presidents of SALT;
Michael Olivas, President-Elect, AALS (The Association of American Law Schools); and the
Author as a Past President of the AALS. The discussion was moderated by Professor Valdes.
4 The questions for the panel's consideration were: 1) Given predictions of U.S. His-
panicization, what is the significance, if any, of this historical coincidence, where the main
institutions of (legal) education all have turned to Latina/os for leadership in recent/current
times? 2) What is the future of outsider groups, theory, organizations, and discourse in educa-
tion, academia, and/or in law and policy? 3) What would you describe as the key challenges/
opportunities for people of color, women, sexual minorities, and other "outsider" groups in
U.S. education and culture today? 4) To meet those challenges/opportunities, how can/should
Latina/o and other outsider scholars become more effective within the organizations you lead/
led? 5) What does your work teach you about "justice" or about struggles for it? 6) Based on
the sum of your particular experience, what should progressive scholars do to make our work
more socially relevant and justice oriented?
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Though this article will not address the formal questions directly, it will
make three small but related points that probe the necessarily unstated as-
sumptions behind the themes of this panel. For example, exploration of La-
tina/o leadership in major legal organizations seems to rest on the
assumption that mere leadership reflects broader social change and that ex-
ploration of the views of Latinalo insiders will somehow produce a theory of
that broader social change. Professor Valdes may not have intended any of
these implications, but he probably would have to concede that they exist.
First, one lesson the author has learned in his years of organizing, is
that one always has to be cognizant of the problem of capture. For those who
study administrative law or organizational theory, this is an old point. On a
personal level, it was perhaps best summed up by my mother who remarked
during a long conversation after my sophomore year in college: "Gerald,
you are white in ways you don't even know." Importantly, it was not in-
tended as a critique rooted in any sense of ethnic authenticity, but rather as
an observation of the ways I had changed in response to the different cultural
and institutional settings in which I found myself. She may have even meant
it as a compliment.
Second is the problem of the tyranny of tokenism. Derrick Bell and
Lani Guinier are probably the best-known expositors of this political and
intellectual hazard. Briefly described, tokenism arises when homogenous in-
stitutions make a commitment to heterogeneity without fully contemplating
the meaning of the change. As an example, the introduction of a few people
of color (to take but one category) concentrates the obligation for change in
that small group. This, in turn, causes them to become both the arbiters of
the meaning of racial heterogeneity, as well as the police at the boundaries.
In addition, they also take on the burden of providing continuing education
for their colleagues or peers. Resisting those obligations is necessary, in the
author's view, to enable the construction of a complex understanding of in-
stitutional change to occur.
Third, every person who is trying to change an institution must have an
insider/outsider strategy in order to confront the ways in which institutional
power is deployed to resist change and to transform the transformer. This is
something that is known--or certainly becomes known-4hrough practice by
everyone who has tried to move institutions.
This article hopes to briefly lay out each of these questions and the
implications that they have on pertinent theories of social change. In doing
so, it also wishes to illuminate the topic of this panel and instill questions of
interest into the community of lawyers and academics committed to the idea
that law can be a vehicle for social change.
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I. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS: CAPTURE AND THE TYRANNY OF TOKENISM
A. Capture
A discussion of capture within the context of the phenomenon under dis-
cussion at this conference might seem misplaced, but the questions posed
today must confront the idea of capture if there is a correlative unstated
assumption that Latinalo leadership in these organizations somehow signi-
fies a difference in kind. It may even be subversive, but that conclusion
should not be presumed.
When people in law schools talk about the problem of capture, they
typically refer to the occasion of a regulatory agency that has ceased to act in
the public interest (or towards the specific regulatory objectives detailed in
their operative statute) and instead acts in the interest of the parties it is
supposed to be regulating. There are different opinions about the underlying
mechanism of capture, but the dominant view is represented by economists
and public choice theorists who suggest that because the regulated parties
have higher stakes than the public as a whole in the outcome of any particu-
lar regulation, they will concentrate resources on influencing the decision-
making process of the regulating agency. This focused tactical and strategic
effort to intervene in the regulatory process tends to influence the final out-
come in a manner that exceeds the expectations contained in the statutory
mission. For example, such a classic case of capture occurred when the Min-
erals Management Service failed to effectively regulate the actions of BP
and Transocean's Deep Water Horizon drilling rig. The utter erasure of the
distinctions between the regulators and the regulated clearly illustrate the
hazards of regulatory capture.'
The insight of those economists and public choice theorists ought to be
generalized to participants in every institution. As psychologist Mahzarin
Banaji puts it: "What social psychology has given to an understanding of
human nature is the discovery that forces larger than ourselves determine our
mental life and our actions-that chief among these forces . . . [is] the
power of the social situation."6 Psychologists and other specialists suggest
that what drives capture is more than mere rent-seeking behavior. The circu-
lation of power throughout institutions creates the channels through which,
to the extent possible, those who are more powerful structure the social situ-
ations that produce definitions of what is real. At the same time, they frame
responses in ways that so vehemently conceal the force of the institutional
structure, that even those who are subject to it cannot see it. This was pre-
' See generally, PETER LEHNER, IN DEEP WATER (2010) (the Macondo Well blowout oc-
curred on Earth Day 2010 (April 20) and was finally capped on July 15, 2010); see also Crude
Justice, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (Feb. 5, 2011, 4:12 AM), http://www.afj.org/resources-and-
publications/films-and-programs/crude-justice/.
6 Mahzarin R. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, 14 PSYCHOL. Sci. AGENDA 8, 8 (2001).
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cisely the point of my mother's observation. Jon Hanson describes this pro-
cess as "deep capture."'
The notion that changes in institutional leadership at any level of the
organizational hierarchy necessarily imply changes in the way that power
will circulate or in whose interest it will be used, begs too many questions.
The main point of the discussion of capture and power is that the mere occu-
pation of a leadership role is not sufficient to promote significant institu-
tional change. Unless an internal leadership role is also accompanied by an
agenda and a constituency of accountability, as well as an external force for
change, it is highly unlikely that the power will be exercised in the interest
of those who were formerly excluded from its benefits. This suggests that
one ought not to extrapolate too much from the success of a few elite mem-
bers of a group; it seems premature to conclude that the group as a whole
has-or soon will-benefit from the success of a few "transcendent" mem-
bers.8 For example, during the time period represented by the tenure of the
panelists, the number of Latinalos graduating from high school and matricu-
lating and graduating from four-year colleges remained disappointingly
low.9 Similarly, the continuing nativist attacks on Latina/os' right to be here
should not be overlooked because of the success of a few. It is fallacious to
assume that there is a deep significance to the simultaneous presence of La-
tina/os in leadership positions at this time. The significance should be
demonstrated. Thus, an appropriate metric should be determined to measure
this significance. One way to begin that inquiry is to ask: what were the
forces that produced this cohort of Latinalo legal academics such that they
would be in a position to occupy the leadership roles they did? The next
question would be: what did they do with those opportunities? While one
question demands a broader historical and sociological inquiry, the other is
specific to the institutions and requires a fine-grained analysis of the possi-
bility for institutional transformation contained within each one.
In sum, the capture thesis, at least as outlined here, is about how power
is mobilized in service of those who already hold "power over" others. 0
' See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129,
218 (2003) ("By 'deep capture' then, we are referring to the disproportionate and self-serving
influence that the relatively powerful tend to exert over all the exterior and interior situational
features that materially influence the maintenance and extension of that power-including
those features that purport to be, and that we experience as, independent, volitional, and
benign.").
'See generally, EUGENE ROBINSON, DISINTEGRATION: THE SPLINTERING OF BLACK
AMERICA (2010) (describing a "transcendent" elite as having "different profiles, different
mind-sets" that separated them "by demography, geography, and psychology" from poor or
working-class black Americans); see also, Raymond Arsenault, The Great Unraveling, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, book review available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/books/
review/Arsenault-t.html?_r= 1&ref=books.
' See, Gerald Torres, The Elusive Goal of Equal Educational Opportunity in LAW AND
CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones eds.,
2006).
0 See, Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Rethinking Conventions of Zero-Sum Power in THE
MINER'S CANARY 108-30 (2002).
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Those who find themselves in a position to use the institutional regulatory
authority are going to be subject to pressure from those who have tradition-
ally benefitted from the way the institution has functioned. The easiest route
to conventional success within such organizations is to understand the wis-
dom of the way power has always worked and to act consistent with the
normative vision contained within that wisdom. That some might be cajoled
into imitating the easiest or most likely route to traditional ideas of success
is certainly understandable, but that is not the path to change. The next sec-
tion tries to explain why.
B. The Tyranny of Tokenism
What happens when a relatively homogeneous institution initiates a move-
ment towards greater heterogeneity? Do the steps undertaken reflect a deep
commitment to change or to stability? Surface changes may do more to so-
lidify power in the hands of the powerful than the reverse. The process that
leads to the inclusion of those who were previously excluded has, in some
sense, helped legitimize the norms that had previously been used to exclude.
Token changes at the top may obviate the need to pursue more fundamental
structural changes. Uncovering the ways in which this occurs raises troub-
ling problems, but also suggests a means forward, because they can create
the opportunities for real change.
One of the dominant norms in our culture is the belief in possessive
individualism and our reliance on it to explain social failure or success on
the basis of the actions of individual persons rather than on the structural
constraints (or opportunities) that institutions may present. The idea that
each of us is individually responsible for the way our lives turn out as well
as for the effects of specific decisions is deeply ingrained in American life.
Of course, individual responsibility is hardly insignificant, but it is not com-
pletely explanatory.
Relatively unconstrained social mobility is another important belief"
that when linked to the idea of personal individual responsibility, conflates
the two convictions. In other words, the presence of formerly excluded per-
sons in what had previously been a homogeneous dominant group legiti-
mizes the idea of individual social mobility as the principal justification for
appropriate techniques of social engineering. If you create opportunities for
individuals, then you do not need to question the deep values ingrained in
the exclusionary structure of the institutions that are now, at least on their
face, open to former outsiders.12
By acting in ways that increase the belief in the permeability of the
boundaries between dominant and subordinate groups, what is also rein-
" See, Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 143-71 (2003) (illustrating the distinctions be-
tween contest, sponsored and structural mobility).
12 For a more in-depth analysis of this point, see GUINIER & ToRREs, supra note 10, at 32-
66, 108-30.
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forced is the idea that those who continue to be excluded deserve their fate
as much as the now included persons deserve theirs. This is not premised on
the presence of a left/right ideological divide in the struggle over integration
of our civic and civil institutions. Instead, by endorsing strategies that are
premised on individual advancement in order to achieve social goals, civil
rights advocates partake in the same metanarrative as the opponents of those
efforts: when individuals get ahead, the group triumphs, and the basic demo-
cratic structure of American social life prevails. While the individual Latinal
o's advancement to a leadership position involves an act of "transcendence"
(moving beyond the reach or stain of group identity and stigma), that same
"transcendence" is simultaneously used to legitimize the status of those left
behind. In other words, that an individual leader could advance in the name
of the group could be interpreted as distinguishing that individual from the
other members of the out-group who were left behind. The merit of the indi-
vidual is used to establish the demerit of the group as a whole.
The difference may lie in the definition of the group that is benefitting,
but the logical structure is identical. That is why, for example, the Grutter
opinion upholding the University of Michigan's affirmative action plan piv-
ots on the idea of "critical mass."" However, while the concept of "critical
mass" is a response to "tokenism," the concept of "critical mass" does not
include access for the "masses."
What is the meaning of "critical mass" in the context of educational
affirmative action? According to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, it
meant a number of things while signifying no commitment to a particular
percentage of admits (since such a target would come dangerously close to
transforming a constitutionally permissible goal into an unconstitutional
quota). Among the many things critical mass did mean was that a sufficient
number of "underrepresented minority" students would be admitted to pre-
vent the admittees from feeling isolated or feeling as if they had to speak for
their entire group whenever they participated in class. Importantly, there also
had to be enough "underrepresented minorities" to ensure that non-members
receive the educational benefits gained from the presence of the minority
class. The multiple meanings of critical mass suggest that the entire process
is not really aimed at transforming the institution in ways that challenge any
of its fundamental commitments. A critical mass of former outsiders may
safeguard the institution from threats of external pressures and also provide
the kind of individual access that will produce institutional loyalty from the
beneficiaries. All of this makes sense, but it has costs and it should not be
confused with more ambitious transformative goals.
One of the costs is that if a program like Grutter's is successful, it will
serve to disconnect the admitted individual from the previously excluded
group.14 This happens when the program for inclusion is justified by the
" Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
14 The author does not want to overstate this point because as Richard 0. Lempert, et al.
suggest in "From the Trenches and Towers": Law School Affirmative Action: An Empirical
268 [Vol. 14
same or similar norms that had previously justified exclusion. 5 According to
social psychologist Stephen Wright, this process discourages the accepted
out-group members from employing disruptive actions, which might be con-
sistent with the interests of the excluded out-group members because it
would weaken the identity of the "token" with the dominant group.' 6
It is completely understandable why the successful member of the sub-
ordinated group begins to identify with the dominant group. The value of
being part of the dominant group comes from being acknowledged as a legit-
imate member of that group. Inclusion that is premised on individualistic
norms suggests that "successful social mobility will have a very positive
impact on the individual's social identity." 7 The status of the dominant in-
group will be reflected on the status of the persons who legitimately claim to
be a member of that group.
Where boundaries between groups in a hierarchical relationship are
seen to be semi-permeable, the presence of subordinate group members
within the dominant group has strategic consequences. The fact that a
subordinate group member has succeeded "climbing backwards up the
cheese grater," may influence the social change trajectory for other out-
group members whose attention shifts away from collective agitation to-
wards their own individual exit strategies. The mere presence of the newly-
minted insider can demobilize outsider agitation for more fundamental
change of social institutions. Individual social mobility refocuses attention
on opportunities for exit from the subordinate group rather than on the fun-
damental unfairness of the existing institutional relationship.
Professor Wright's work stands for these two points. First, tokenism
changes the "peer group" of the token who begins to adapt to the insider
culture, and second, tokenism reinforces the illusion of upward mobility in
ways that divert attention from the unfairness of a structure that limits op-
portunity to a very few. To test these hypotheses, Wright designed experi-
ments that demonstrated that the creation of an exit strategy for one or two
former outsiders reframes the problem for those left behind. They no longer
challenge their condition as members of a subordinate group but instead
fight each other to claw their way into the dominant group. By providing an
individual justification for minor changes to the dominant institutions and by
using those changes to suggest the basic permeability of the boundaries be-
Study Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 395, 424 (2000), a higher percentage of minority graduates go on to
public service practice than graduates as a whole.
'5 See, Stephen C. Wright, Ambiguity, Social Influence, and Collective Action: Generating
Collective Protest in Response to Tokenism, 23 PER. Soc. PsycHoL. BULL. 1277, 1277-78
(1997) [hereinafter Ambiguity].
16 Id. at 1279.
'7 Stephen C. Wright & Donald M. Taylor, Success Under Tokenism: Co-option of the
Newcomer and the Prevention of Collective Protest, 38 BRIT. J. OF Soc. PSYCHOL. 369, 371
(1999) [hereinafter Success].
18 Id.
" Ambiguity, supra note 15, at 1279.
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tween the groups, tokenism can be an effective form of managing dissent. 20
As Professor Wright pointed out: "It appears that the success of a very small
number of disadvantaged group members can undermine endorsement of
collective action by focusing attention on personal rather than collective in-
justice and by reducing confidence about the illegitimacy and instability of
the intergroup context." 21 Thus, to the extent that disadvantage is perceived
to be a result of personal failure or personal injustice, the systemic sources
of injustice are insulated from critique. By deflecting attention from the in-
stitutional sources of disadvantage, the dominant group can reduce "the
level of disruptive collective action . . . preventing real social change." 22
II. A THEORY OF CHANGE
The pressure for change will not come from people who are happy with
the way things are or from people who feel hopeless. Change can be
imagined only when the boundary between dominant and subordinate groups
is at least semi-permeable and where the institutional structure that regulates
power is seen as unstable. That much is a truism. So how does someone who
wants to use his/her access to dominant groups resist the problem of capture
or the tyranny of tokenism?
Membership in the elite by a member of a formerly excluded group can
lead to change only if that person has a systemic agenda that is supported by
an external constituency to whom that individual remains accountable.23
Consider the experience of a black lawyer in Selma, Alabama in the 1960s.
J.L. Chestnut, in his memoir of his days in Selma at the beginning of the
civil rights movement, noticed that he was witnessing "a transformation
from civil rights leaders to politicians, from outside protesters to inside ma-
nipulators."2 4 The problem arises from overconfidence on the part of insiders
as to their ability to "manipulate" the institutions of which they now find
themselves a part. So how is the insider/outsider divide negotiated in the
interest of subordinate groups? Professor Guinier and the author have sug-
gested one possibility:
[O]nce an outsider is put in such a position, the key to re-
sisting power-to the extent that it is a zero-sum resource-is to
remain "critical." In the words of W.E.B. DuBois, to be critical
means one is capable of experiencing double consciousness. It is
20 Id.; see also, Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and
the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1043 (1988) (discussing civil rights law as a
form of racial management).
21 Ambiguity, supra note 15, at 1286.
22 Id. at 1287.
23 See generally, Gerald Torres, Social Movements and the Ethical Construction of Law,
37 CAPITAL L. REv. 535 (2009).
24 J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA: THE UNCOMMON LIFE OF J.L.
CHESTNUT, JR. 212 (1990).
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not impossible to be an insider and an outsider simultaneously.
But [sic] if outsiders who have become insiders desire to retain
their critical double consciousness as they exercise power or au-
thority within the status quo, they need an independent source of
power. In other words, if one is an outsider now operating as an
insider, unless mechanisms are in place that give other outsiders
power, the insider's power will come to depend increasingly on the
views of other insiders. This makes it less likely that an insider,
acting alone but in good conscience or with good intentions, can
simultaneously enlist and resist authority.
Thus, infiltrating hierarchy in order to redistribute power usu-
ally will not succeed unless the new insider has an energized or
powerful base of outsiders as support. In fact, only by having a
real and vital connection to such a base can new insiders remain
politically or intellectually independent of the enormous pressure
otherwise to conform. Marooned individuals, cut off from their
base, may be reluctant to push for change; or they may be
marginalized and unable to do so. 25
Accordingly, an insider/outsider theory of change depends on the cor-
relative construction of a constituency of accountability, i.e., a group of peo-
ple who share a common identity, who are jointly committed to a
transformative vision, and who work together to hold their members ac-
countable to that vision. This depends in large measure on the insider retain-
ing a principal connection to a group of outsiders. This is precisely the
strategy that is most problematic because, as Professor Wright has demon-
strated, the tension between expectations for systemic change and what it
takes for newly-minted insiders to burnish their insider credentials among
dominant group members is what is most commonly exploited by the more
powerful as a mechanism of management. 26
A successful insider/outsider strategy not only depends on the dynamics
within a single organization or institution, but it also depends on using com-
peting agendas of a variety of social organizations to produce pressure for
change. What it demands of the insider is that he or she maintain a legitimate
presence in both the dominant group and in whatever outsider or subordinate
groups have produced him or her. It is neither bottom-up nor top-down, but a
combination of those strategies-especially because bottom-up or top-down
will have a different valence depending on where one is standing and what
result one is trying to achieve.
A school reform project in Texas reflects a version of this insider/out-
sider strategy. In Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby,27 the
Texas Supreme Court declared that the state has an obligation under the
25 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY 122 (2002) (footnotes
omitted).
26 Success, supra note 17, at 382; Ambiguity, supra note 15, at 1278.
27 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
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Texas State Constitution to equalize funding in public schools. The
Edgewood court noted that "[t]he wealthiest district ha[d] over
$14,000,000 of property wealth per student, while the poorest ha[d] approx-
imately $20,000; this disparity reflects a 700 to 1 ratio." 28
Despite attempts to solve the political problems invariably connected to
school finance reform, the ultimate legislative fix was able to reduce the
disparity ratio from 700:1 to 28:1.29 Nonetheless, the reform did not resolve
the many problems associated with chronic underfunding.
Because school finance reform had largely failed to produce real educa-
tional reform, a local organization called Texas LEADS (Local Empower-
ment for Accessible and Diverse Schools) was born. 0 The guiding principle
behind the organization was that poor schools would have to figure out how
to achieve academic success without additional funding. If a school could
succeed on a local level, it could provide a model for more general school
reform at the same time that it activated the community towards that effort.
Some poor districts across the state had been achieving academic success for
their students and LEADS was determined to figure out how they were do-
ing it.
After LEADS conducted surveys and on-the-ground interviews in the
respective schools, a local school was chosen. Texas LEADS entered into a
partnership with the school as the school was planning to implement an
afterschool program for "at risk" children that required some parent pro-
gramming. The school was also busy planning the opening of a magnet pro-
gram in government, law, and humanities. Magnet programs were often
contentious because new resources associated with them had typically been
concentrated on students from outside the local community. At around mid-
year, these issues were compounded when the principal announced that he
was leaving. Texas LEADS played a crucial role in gathering the views of
parents and in helping to integrate them in the selection of a new principal.
LEADS was only able to play this role because of its active engagement
with the parents and the community surrounding the school, as well as with
the school district and the local administrators.
Because LEADS was committed to working with all parents, it had to
deal with traditional parents as well as with those whose own histories in-
cluded negative school experiences. One of the first steps was to create a
public space that the parents "owned"-through which they could engage
the school. The creation of this space prompted the development of tools to
engage the parents in broader conversations about the school and educa-
tional policy. A team of teachers, parents, and staff was created to direct and
oversee the partnership project and to implement state required site-based
28 Id. at 392.
29 See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for
Educational Equity, 17 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 607, 634-703 (1999) (detailing the aftermath of
Edgewood).
30 The author founded Texas LEADS in 1998.
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planning. A parent was hired as an on-site peer parent coordinator who de-
veloped links to local resources related to parent involvement and began
implementing parent programming based on the stated desires of parents and
school officials. This group of parents became "The Action Team," which
could function as an adjunct to the Campus Advisory Council (CAC), the
state-mandated, site-based decision making body that was made up of teach-
ers, parents, community members, and staff. LEADS intended to incorporate
the Action Team into the existing structure to become an "inside" project
that would not be perceived or treated as a temporary program operated by
outsiders. LEADS also embedded the programming in the school by adopt-
ing the Action Team's parent/teacher/staff structure as a strategy to ensure
long-term continuity.
The Intercultural Development Research Association (IDRA), one of
the key players in the school equity litigation, led a series of parent leader-
ship workshops at Texas LEADS' invitation. They taught parents to inter-
view each other at the workshops, and they soon began to appreciate the
need to provide feedback on what they learned to inform other substantive
conversations concerning education.
Texas LEADS also helped build several links with the community, in-
cluding the creation of vertical teams with those elementary schools that fed
into the middle school and with the high schools into which the middle
school fed. LEADS formed links with local churches and with El Buen
Samaritano, a local Episcopal mission that assists poor, Spanish-speaking,
working families. All of the services were available in the Parents' Room or
through the Parent Liaison. Moreover, because the liaison was intimately
connected to the community and was entrusted with school officials, parents,
and people in the surrounding communities, the parent liaison provided a
focus and a guiding hand for all parent-related activities. The Parent Liaison
gave the parents the confidence that there was a dedicated, full-time person
solely devoted to their needs. Virtually everyone agreed that the creation of
the Parent Liaison and the Parents' Room were among the Project's greatest
successes.
By changing the culture of the school, the parents came to feel that the
school was theirs. Importantly, the cultural changes that allowed the parents
to feel this way were the products of the physical changes in the school as
well as a transformation of any us-versus-them dynamic that had predated
the LEADS Project. The Parents' Room begot better communication among
parents and between parents and the school, leading parents to develop peer
driven surveys, a newsletter, a phone tree, and a website.
The story of Texas LEADS illustrates several elements of the theory of
change being proposed here. Among them is the crucial idea that for change
to be possible it is necessary to avoid both capture and premature or whole-
sale identification with the dominant powers. Nonetheless, agents of change
have to both be invested in the institution, as well as in the community that
supports or demands the change. Texas LEADS maintained strong ties to the
surrounding community; it did not solely rely on the trust and confidence of
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the school officials. As an agent of change, Texas LEADS invested in the
school as an educational institution and worked to maintain the school as a
site of refuge and source of support for community members who sought
and demanded significant change. Texas LEADS learned that substantive
change in a school moves at the same pace as it does in the community. It
also learned to function with an ongoing inner tension, sometimes making
the project an inside force for change while at other times making it an
outside force.
Texas LEADS may have entered the school with the intention of being
an insider whose goal was to institutionalize change. Those at the forefront
of the effort soon learned, however, that "insiders" get pulled away to serve
other needs of the district and of the school. To serve more effectively, Texas
LEADS ultimately maintained a separation from the school and a flexibility
that allowed the organization to play inside and outside roles as dictated by
function. None of its successes could have been achieved if the organization
had not succeeded in generating a legitimate presence both inside and
outside of the dominant institutions. The redefinition of stakeholders was
one of the most important ancillary benefits that the project achieved."
CONCLUSION: LATINA/o EDUCATION AND JUSTICE: LEADING VOICES,
LESSONS LEARNED?
This article has suggested that the ideas of synecdoche and metonymy
are not just figures of speech in which the part stands in for the whole. They
are potentially useful metaphoric devices to understand the politics of insti-
tutional change through the inclusion of the formerly excluded.
Capture: here the hazard is that those who find themselves in a position
to use institutional power may find themselves subject to pressure to con-
form to the norms and values of those who have traditionally benefitted from
the conventional use of that institution's authority. This will often be subtle
and it may merely be a means to reduce tension and conflict. It might be the
easiest route to conventional success within such organizations; but acting in
a way that is always consistent with the normative vision of the dominant
institution has its costs, and one of those costs may be the loss of critical
perspective.
The hazards associated with what is called the tyranny of tokenism
arise from the impact of that process on neutralizing the energy for collec-
tive action. This article suggests that collective rather than individual action
is necessary to produce institutional or social change, and any process that
neutralizes or redirects that energy for substantive change is not likely to be
in the larger interest of the subordinate group. The social psychological re-
search seems to suggest that tokenism-when combined with cues about the
individual basis for the success of the now included former outsider-often
" See generally, Gerald Torres, Translation and Stories, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1383-
94 (2002) (describing the Texas LEADS project).
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creates a gulf between members of the dominant and subordinate groups,
even if membership in the dominant group is completely contingent. It is a
version of the capture thesis, but with more attention to the impact on social
policies that create contingent insiders. Finally, a theory of change that does
not retain an argument for continued accountability to members of the
subordinate group is not an argument for serious social change.
The problem of synecdoche, the part standing in for the whole, suggests
that one be cautious when trying to generalize from the presence of former
outsiders in positions of leadership in dominant institutions. Although it may
seem socially important, in reality, it might not be. Its meaning can only
begin to be understood if one asks questions about those contingent insiders,
about the dynamics of the institution within which they are functioning, and
about one's own theory of change which will, of course, be informed by the
goals one sets.
